Box 3. Recent changes in the Swedish Central Bank´s monetary policy by Banco de España. Dirección General de Economía y Estadística
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2020  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
In December 2019, Sweden’s central bank (Sveriges 
Riksbank) raised its benchmark interest rate (the repo 
rate) for the second time in twelve months. It set it at 0%, 
up from the previous level of -0.25%, with effect from 
January 2020. Swedish interest rates thus abandoned the 
negative territory in which Sveriges Riksbank had placed 
them since February 2015 (see Chart 1). Holding rates 
negative had been part of the raft of unconventional 
monetary policy measures set in place by Sweden’s 
monetary authority since 2009. This also included forward 
guidance on interest rates, bond purchases, currency 
swaps and support for lending to businesses, among 
other things. This box summarises the macroeconomic 
and financial stability conditioning factors which, 
according to the Swedish authorities, are behind this 
monetary policy decision.
Sveriges Riksbank justified its decision to increase the 
interest rate to 0%, which it had already anticipated in 
October, essentially on the basis of inflation developments. 
In Sweden, the inflation rate had stood at around the 
target of 2% from 2017 until end-2019 (see Chart 2) and 
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SOURCES: Sveriges Riksbank, Swedish National Institute of Statistics and Konjunkturinstitutet.
a CPIF inflation, which excludes changes in mortgage rates, is Sveriges Riksbank's target variable.
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Box 3
RECENT CHANGES IN THE SWEDISH CENTRAL BANK’S MONETARY POLICY (cont’d)
inflation expectations had remained relatively anchored 
between 1.8% and 2% over the previous year. According 
to the Swedish central bank’s analysis, inflation is 
estimated to be on a path compatible with the fulfilment of 
its objective. Admittedly, the Swedish economy slowed in 
2019 and the growth outlook was revised downwards (see 
Chart 3); but Sveriges Riksbank’s analysis points to the 
pace of growth in activity returning to normal following a 
period of relatively high buoyancy. The decision emerged 
from Sweden’s Monetary Policy Committee after intense 
debate, as evidenced by the minutes of its December 
meeting. In particular, the minutes noted the difficulties of 
accurately gauging the extent to which inflation 
expectations are firmly anchored around the central 
bank’s target. And this against a background in which 
Sveriges Riksbank foresees an inflation path slowly 
converging at the end of the projection horizon on the 
aforementioned target (see Chart 2).
According to the central bank’s projections, published in 
December with the press release on the monetary policy 
decision, the policy rate will be held at 0% until 2022 Q2. 
This contrasts with its previous December 2018 projection, 
which anticipated a path of further increases over the 
coming years (see Chart 1).1 Therefore, for Sveriges 
Riksbank, the rate rise does not necessarily mean a 
tightening of the monetary policy stance,2 but a return to 
a more conventional monetary policy without negative 
interest rates which, among other things, would provide 
some leeway, if needed. 
In addition to the above-mentioned considerations, in its 
press release Sveriges Riksbank also lists some of the 
financial stability-related arguments taken into 
consideration. Particular mention is made of the possibility 
that economic agents would no longer perceive the 
negative rates situation as temporary. Among other risks, 
the Swedish monetary authority considers the hypothetical 
adverse consequences for the banking system, the private 
sector’s potential over-indebtedness and a possible 
excessive increase in risk appetite, which might give rise 
to distortions in the functioning of financial markets, 
including the overvaluation of certain assets. 
As for the first risk, according to Sveriges Riksbank banks 
have not passed on negative interest rates to household 
deposits, owing to the perceived temporariness of the 
measure, and banks’ lending capacity and profitability 
have not been affected significantly to date. However, the 
Swedish monetary authority does not completely rule out 
that continuing to apply a negative interest rate policy for 
a very long period of time could hypothetically prompt a 
decline in the demand for deposits. And that could in turn 
produce a shortage of this type of financing at some 
banks.3 Additionally, according to the monetary authority, 
squeezing bank margins for a sufficiently protracted 
period of time could theoretically affect new lending by 
some banks. 
Possible adverse effects of a premature increase in 
interest rates on financial stability were also pointed out; 
agents’ ability to pay could be hampered against a 
backdrop of lower growth and high levels of private debt 
(see Chart 4). Nevertheless, Sveriges Riksbank has 
stressed that private-sector indebtedness-related risks – 
largely linked to the real estate market4 – must be 
addressed by macroprudential policy instruments (within 
the remit since 2014 of the Finansinspektionen, which 
reports to the Ministry of Finance) and by structural 
reforms.
In conclusion, and based on the foregoing considerations, 
of different sign, Sveriges Riksbank considers that, in net 
terms, the negative rates policy has been beneficial for 
the Swedish economy. It likewise believes any future side-
effects can be assumed, though it highlights the need for 
them to be analysed in greater detail. 
1   Note that, unlike ECB/Eurosystem projections, which assume that interest rates will follow the path expected by financial markets, the Riksbank’s 
macroeconomic projections are shaped by its own expected path of policy rates.
2   In the weeks following Sveriges Riksbank’s announcement in October, the Swedish krona appreciated against the dollar and the euro after a period 
of protracted weakness, which could mean that the financial markets perceived a tightening. However, attributing the appreciation solely to monetary 
policy is difficult since it coincided with a period of upward surprises in economic indicators and greater optimism about world trade, which is highly 
significant for a small open economy like Sweden’s. Since early 2020, the Swedish krona has depreciated again due to global uncertainty and worse-
than-expected macroeconomic data.
3   Note that the low use of cash in Sweden could soften the possible difficulties of potential liquidity problems. Worldwide, Sweden is the economy which 
least uses cash, and its objective is to replace it with electronic means of payment by 2023. Thus, if negative interest rates were applied to household 
deposits, this would possibly have a more subdued effect on the demand for cash.
4  Since 1994, there has been a robust upward trend in house prices in Sweden which is essentially attributable to structural factors such as supply 
shortages and high construction costs.
